With intelligence there was extensive discussion and debate and negotiation from the highest strategic level down to the minutest technical level: about what the constitution said about intelligence services; about the White Paper on Intelligence and abut the processes arosing out of the TEC.
There was a Heads of Civilian Services Committee, HOCS, on which Nhlanhla sat along with the heads of: NIS; the Venda service; the Bop service and the Transkei service. Under that committee was the so-called Amalgamation Committee with people like Mo Shaik, I think Billy Masethla, Mohamed Timol, and others. So there was policy negotiation and formulation and there was structural negotiation, including the decision to create two services, and drafting of legislation. Then under the Amalgamation Committee there was what we called the Super Working Groups – I don’t know where the ‘super’ came from but that was what we called them – which were organised more or less along what would become the chief directorates in the two new services. I was in the one for foreign offices. In those working groups we negotiated down to details: which services we would have cooperative relations with; where we would have SASS offices and all those kinds of things; until it came to negotiating each post in each of the structures, and finally who would go into each post and structure. Of course we were in the minority, but I am just making the point.